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BACKGROUND
The Electronic Conference on “CGIAR Governance, Organization and Structure” took
place between 24 July and 25 August, 2000. The conference was convened by the
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the Oversight Committee of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and was managed by RIMISP,
Chile.
The objective of the conference was to contribute recommendations from a diverse group
of interested individuals, to the formulation of a new structure and governance for the
CGIAR, in accordance with the new vision and strategy that has been recently approved by
its members.
This conference was preceeded by a similar one, held earlier in the year, that focused on the
new vision and strategy for the CGIAR.
The specific issues discussed during the conference were: (a) managing genetic resources
and intellectual property; (b) management of global, regional and ecoregional programmes;
(c) management and structure of the International Agricultural Research Centers, and; (d)
reforming the central bodies and functions of the CGIAR.
Close to 500 persons from all over the world participated in this dialogue. Seventy four
messages were exchanged during the conference. The background documents and all the
messages are posted at http://www.rimisp.cl/cg2010b
STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE FOLLOW PURPOSE AND FUNCTION
The discussion was marked by the topics discussed during the first two weeks: management
of genetic resources and intellectual property, and management of global, regional and
ecoregional programs. While the second question could be thought of as an organizational
principle applicable to the different objectives of the CGIAR, it in fact was associated to the
more specific question of poverty reduction, or of NRM for poverty reduction.
During the debate it became clear that managing genetic resources and erradicating poverty
are not easily compatible objectives from the point of view of structure, organization and
governance.
Contributors to the discussion on genetic resources emphasized the central importance of
the new developments in biotechnology, the leading role of the private sector, the need to
consider intellectual property rights, the obligations imposed by international agreements,
and the comparative advantage of highly specialized advanced research organizations that
command many more resources of all kinds than those that can be movilized by the
CGIAR. Advances in genetic resource management are increasingly market-driven. In
short, the issues of genetic resources and intellectual property rights are shaped by powerful
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trends in science and the global economy that the CGIAR can influence only in a very
limited way.
The discussion on poverty reduction and NRM stressed a quite different set of actors,
determinants and opportunities. The key CGIAR partners include national governments,
NARS, NGO, and farmers' organizations. Embedding CGIAR research within
comprehensive development policies and programs is highlighted as a condition for impact.
The link between strategic research and delivery, adaptation and diffusion of technology
becomes essential, and is also the case of the development of local institutions to support
technological innovation. Research that targets poverty and NRM tends to be more site-
specific, and participatory research approaches are necessary for success.
Can a single organization, structure and governance system serve effectively both sets of
issues? While there are some areas in which intersection does seem to be clearly possible,
the debate held during this conference made it clear that accomplishing this is not an easy
task.
MANAGEMENT OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The following are the main topics and arguments of this section of the conference:
1. The Genetic Resources issue is not driving the debate about structure and governance. As
one contributor put it, "to a large extent this is an issue at the mercy of the restructuring."
Along this line, some even argued that this issue should be somehow be left out of the
considerations of structure and reorganization of the system. Those who will have the
responsibility of making the final decisions about the new CGIAR structure and
governance, should perhaps read this agreement as a warning light.
2. Greater coordination is necessary for policy, information and management of genetic
resources. In addition new scientific developments call for greater coordination, such as
applications across related species. "Collective management" is required to provide a
framework in which collections are conserved, maintained, regenerated, characterized and
evaluated. The CGIAR cannot afford to have complete autonomy of the Centers and a
collectively managed Genetic Resources program. Centers must cede some authority to a
central authority, and they must be prepared to live up to their commitment.
3. Strong arguments were provided by many participants against the idea of complete
centralization of GRM under a Corporate model. Such a system would be costly to
establish and maintain. It would risk compromising the nature of the CGIAR as "an
international public goods institution." It would eventually lead to the separation of
germplasm conservation and utilization. Finally, it was extensively argued that major legal
complexities would need to be resolved before such a fully centralized system could be put
in place.
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4. Genetic Resource Management (GRM) involves collection, conservation,
characterization and utilization of germplasm. All participants agreed that is was imperative
to maintain close links between collection, conservation, characterization and exchange, on
one hand, and  utilization of germplasm, improved genotypes and protection of intellectual
property on the other. Greater coordination of efforts cannot imperil these strong links.
5. A "defensive IPR policy" was favored by many participants from the CGIAR and the
CGIAR donor communities,  as the best way of optimizing the prospects of benefits of
GRM reaching the poor. The notion of the CGIAR's germplasm collection as "bargaining
chips" came up often: the CG should strive to negotiate joint ventures with the private
sector, to stimulate it to contribute to the needs of poor farmers and marginal regions.
They argued that such a policy would be in the spirit of the CGIAR as an international
public goods institution. It was recognized that some exceptions may be necessary to offer
exclusive licenses to ensure the full development and delivery of some technologies (e.g.
animal vaccines).
Representatives of the private sector argued that "in the age of biotechnology and IPR, the
time honored and noble concept of 'international public goods' relative to genetically
improved material is essentially obsolete and needs to be redefined... [the concept of]
Internationally Public Goods is irreconcilable with proprietary technology, IPR and
responsible biosafety... the private sector is willing to license important proprietary
technology for the benefit of the CG genetic improvement goals, but only on a negotiated
basis... the private sector cannot and will not share competitive technologies for
incorporation in products which will be disseminated in an uncontrolled manner."
Some participants from NARS argued that the CGIAR should not do anything that a private
company could do; it is not the role of an international public goods organization to
cooperate nor to compete with the private sector. The basic criteria for an international
public goods institution is to correct market failures, of which there are several in the area
of genetic resources: access by the poor and long term consequences of present day
decisions are two that are of particular importance.
Participants from the NGO community, argued that the CGIAR should act as a counterforce
to the private sector, to mitigate or compensate its growing influence on the direction of
scientific developments.
In conclusion, this is an area in which there are still major disagreements about vision and
strategy. As a result, the range of options about structure, organization and governance is
also very wide.
6. With respect to the question of funding the genetic resources activities of the CGIAR,
most of the contributions stressed that this issue could not and should not continue to be
approached as one which is of exclusive interest only to developing countries, development
goals or even to agriculture. The formula of seeking an Endowment Fund outside the
traditional funding sources of the CGIAR, received wide support. Support for such Fund
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could come from organizations that have a global and long range mandate, such as the
United Nations (FAO), for whom the Centers maintain the genebanks in trust. The essential
characteristic of such a Fund should be to provide very long term support to an activity that
is of interest to the global community and that needs to be based on the criteria of
"consistency, long-term planning, transparency and [close agreement with] international
agreements."
MANAGING GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND ECOREGIONAL PROGRAMS
As already mentioned, the discussion under this heading rapidly focused on poverty
eradication (PE) or on Natural Resource Management (NRM) with a focus on poverty
reduction. For some reason which was not really clarified, the management of genetic
resources was largely left out by the participants in their treatment of regional and
ecoregional programs.
The main issues in this section of the conference are as follows:
1. Currently, the CG Centers are basically organized on a global basis. Such an approach
has contributed to poverty reduction only in certain regions, under certain socioeconomic
and institutional contexts, and with respect to specific categories of farmers. Most
participants implicitly or explicitly subscribed to the notion that a regional approach is
justified to improve the impact of the CG system on poverty reduction in all those cases
where the global approach has not worked well. The regional approach may work better in
these cases, because it facilitates the integration of research into comprehensive poverty
reduction policies and programs. A few reacted to this framework, arguing that the NRM
challenge in agriculture needed to respond to a much broader set of issues, including how
agriculture affects ecosystems, how agriculture is impacted by the effects of other human
activities on the environment, and how new kinds of ecological services can be sustained or
enhanced by farming practices and technologies.
2. In different ways, many participants argued that successful regional programs would
require to meet the following conditions: a clear and common understanding of the
underlying concepts and principles (something that, according to some is still lacking), a
clear focus on a limited set of major research problems and opportunities with a strategic
dimension, strong scientific leadership, and a proven capacity to articulate and manage
effective and cost-efficient collaboration in the research process. Yet, some who shared this
point of view recognized that it was not a simple matter to identify major research problems
and opportunities that are both relevant to poverty reduction in those cases in which the
global approach has not worked well, and that at the same time meet the criteria of
involving strategic, international public goods.
3. A major element of the regional approach is the concept of regional partnerships. Most
participants agreed that regional approaches and an ability to work through partnerships,
are two sides of the same coin. It is recognized by many that the existence and effectiveness
of suitable regional partners is an assumption that often cannot be met. Partnerships for
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poverty reduction must involve partners with whom the CGIAR has not worked in the past,
such as NGOs and farmers' organizations. The perspectives of these new partners are not
science-driven or research-focused. In fact, some representatives of major NARS argued
that many of them – and the governments of their countries -  today are placing a stronger
emphasis not on poverty reduction per se, but on growth and competitiveness; this implies
that an effort would be necessary to identify the common priorities of CG Centers and
NARS, and that it cannot be assumed that there is full agreement between the CGIAR
agenda and that of developing countries. Building and managing partnerships with non-
CGIAR stakeholders is difficult, expensive and requires specific skills and attitudes that the
IARC often do not have. In particular, it was argued that the system of incentives that
underlies research priorities and decision-making (at the level of the CG system, of the
IARC Boards, of specific programs and of individual scientists) would need to be deeply
revised to create an environment that encourages engagement in multi-actor, inter-
disciplinary partnerships for poverty reduction. Also in relation to this question, the issue
was raised that organizing the CGIAR according to a regional approach, would invite
national governments to assert control over the policies and programs of the Centers; again,
to many this was a major concern, while others see this as a development that should be
welcomed.
4. Several participants argued that because of the nature of rural poverty and the kind of
policies that are necessary to reduce it, there will be strong pressures for CGIAR research to
become more development-oriented. As one participant put it, "for research to be an
effective poverty reduction tool, the particular roles, foci and approaches of research must
be defined within a broader poverty assessment and structured to fit into a broader poverty
reduction strategy... in short, setting research priorities for poverty reduction depends upon
broader development strategies and are fundamentally political decisions." However, other
participants argued that CGIAR strategic and adaptive research will naturally tend to have
faster and more direct benefits for the more affluent farmers of the developing countries,
because they command the resources that are required to adopt new technologies. Many
participants - in particular those closely related to the CGIAR, including some associated
with major donors of the system - see this as an important threat to the essential role of the
CG system. Others (e.g., some NGOs and NARS) think this is a necessary shift that needs
to be managed and implemented pro-actively. For what purposes and how to manage this
research-development interface appears to be an important divisive issue, as was already
apparent during the first of this series of electronic conferences.
5. Many participants argued that when the issue is poverty reduction and NRM,
participatory research approaches are essential. Research should strive to contribute to
supporting and stimulating learning processes and local institutions to manage and sustain
them. While participatory approaches are already widely used during on-farm testing and
validation, it was argued that they need to be incorporated much earlier in the research
process.
6. How to maintain science quality in the regional approach was another issue debated in
this part of the conference. Some argued that the new approach should in no way weaken
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the well tested conventional criteria and procedures for the evaluation of scientific quality.
In the words of one participant, "work that does not meet the statistical standards required
for quality research... or fails in design or implementation or reporting so that the
appropriate peer group of scientists rejects the work and its conclusions, cannot provide
international public goods". Others, however, stated that science quality is not always of
direct  relevance for many development activities, and that the systems cannot and should
not insist on research protocols that are consistent with established scientific practice if they
do not help to address specific development issues; as stated in one message: "... the use of
participatory methods and tools should help us understand farmers' indigenous knowledge
and decision processes, which can help the centers design adoptable technologies which
work for farmers... Isn't that the point, rather than science for its own sake."
ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF
THE CENTERS AND THE CENTRAL BODIES OF THE CGIAR
During the conference, there were several contributions that proposed alternatives for the
organization, structure and governance of the IARCs and the central bodies of the CGIAR.
Some of these options demand large organizational changes relative to the current CGIAR,
while others only involve much smaller adjustments.  Some offer an outline for a whole-
system restructuring, while others relate to more specific issues or components. In the
following pages, these options have been arranged (more or less) according to the degree to
which they depart from the current structure, organization and governance of the CGIAR,
starting with those that propose the least changes.
1. Think hard before embarking on a reorganization process
Many participants offered a range of arguments urging the CGIAR to rethink its apparent
commitment to launching a major restructuring process.
The arguments offered in support of this position included: (a) the danger of political
intervention and manipulation by national governments, (b) the advantages of maintaining a
sharp focus and a relatively narrow research mandate, (c) the lack of evidence that NRM is
or can be the keystone of the Centers’ research programs (“too many dimensions means too
many uncontrolled variables”), (d) the financial and management strains that would follow
from a closer association or involvement in development, (e) the fact that poverty reduction
objectives can be achieved by integrating research on NRM with efforts on institutions and
organizations, without any need for major structural modifications, (f) major restructuring
processes can be disruptive, for example, by stimulating a slowing down of the research
process and the loss of well-trained scientists, and (g) in major reorganizations, costs are
certain and benefits and uncertain, and the CGIAR has not yet done its homework in terms
of taking a close look at its own past reorganizational experiences, nor has it involved
world-class experts on organizational change to evaluate is current cost structure and
incentive systems and the costs and benefits of different alternatives .
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2. Collaboration on global programs
This model was submitted institutionally by ICRISAT. Its basic proposition is that the
CGIAR should pursue global functions, executed through IARCs deployed with a regional
focus.
In a first stage, these functions should only be approached through behavioral change, that
is, through closer collaboration between the existing Centers, working together on global
programs, and within regional settings.
Structural changes would be left for a second stage, to be implemented in the future if at all
necessary. The exception would be the institution of a Future Harvest Executive Director to
streamline the CGIAR Secretariat. Its functions would include public awareness,
fundraising and supporting common administrative tasks.
Individual IARCs should participate in research on sub-regional agendas. These agendas
would be developed in consultative fashion with regional and national organizations.
3. Fully accountable governance and management
This option is based on the model of the Australian Cooperative Research Centre
Programme. It was proposed by J. Vercoe.
Global, regional and eco-regional responsibilities should be assigned to the existing
Centers. Centers would have to agree on who does what, and from there derive their
specific mandates.
Center Boards would be key players in this model, as they would be charged with the
responsibility to deliver on the conditions laid out in their mandate. Boards would be
legally accountable for the success of their projects organized under their mandate. Boards
can delegate responsibilities but not accountability. Board composition would have to
reflect the new mandates. Boards would also be legally accountable for maintaining
scientific quality.
Projects would be identified through agreements (joint ventures) between Centers and other
organizations that can contribute to its objectives. Projects would have managers, who
would have the responsibility and authority to identify outputs, assemble resources, set
time-frames, and monitor progress. Project managers would report to individuals or groups
nominated by the respective Board. All researchers in the project would report to the
Project manager, independently of the Center that employs them; the joint venture that
generate each project would include specific performance agreements between the staff
involved and their legal and project managers.
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4. Consolidation into Ecoregional Centers
This model was proposed by A. El- Beltagy. It is proposed that the responsibilities of
existing Centers can be restructured and relocated so that the CGIAR can meet the new
objectives defined in its Vision 2010.
One Ecoregional Center would be responsible for each of the following five ecoregions: (a)
Humid Tropics in Latin America, (b) Humid Tropics in Africa, (c) Humid Tropics and
Non-Tropics in Asia, (d) Dry Tropics, and (e) Non-Tropic Dry Areas.
Each Ecoregional Center would serve as hubs for integration of research on GRM and
NRM to develop sustainable production systems for target beneficiaries within their
respective ecoregion.  These Centers would also identify priority areas where rural poverty
is concentrated.
Global Centers, organized on a thematic or commodity basis, would also exist. They would
contribute their outputs to the Ecoregional Centers, who would be responsible for their
integration into sustainable production systems. The research agenda of the Global Centers
would be driven by the combined  research priorities identified by the Ecoregional Centers.
Global Centers would not have sub-centers in any region. In particular, genetic
improvement would be a task of the Global Centers according to the commodities with
which they work, while the integration of the improved germplasm into sustainable
production systems would be the responsibility of the Ecoregional Centers. Currently
“orphan” commodities that are of high importance to the poor of any given ecoregion,
would have to be “adopted” by that Ecoregional Center.
5. Streamlining the superstructure
P. Sanchez suggest that the goal of the restructuring process should be to transform the
system into a streamlined, cost-efficient global research organization. Reducing overhead
costs and sharpening the CGIAR’s focus on those areas and functions in which it has a
comparative advantage, are two major reasons for this streamlining. The role of the CGIAR
is to do research, and as research is only done by the Centers, the restructuring process
should aim at allowing them to do their job in the best possible way. Streamlining should
focus initially on the CG Secretariat, TAC, Centre Reviews and the way in which the ICW
(International Centers’ Week) and the MTM (Mid-Term Meetings) are conducted.
The CG Secretariat should serve the centers and the donors, by supporting the CG
Chairman and providing common services to the Centers. It should become a legal entity so
that it can deal with IPR issues on behalf of the Centers, and its CEO would be the CGIAR
Director. The new entity would absorb the functions of a number of other central bodies. It
would not be financed by the World Bank, but by the Centers and by contributions from
specific donors. It would be governed by a Board made up of Center directors, donor
representatives, eminent persons, and the CG Director.
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TAC should be restricted to the function of being a technical advisory committee. CGIAR
priorities would originate in the Centers, and be subject to peer review by TAC.   TAC
would be reduced to a small core staff, and would have to outsource tasks to consultants as
needed. TAC would recommend approval or not of Center budgets to the CG members.
Center Reviews should be reviewed, to drastically streamlining them, making them more
agile, less costly, less focused on producing thick formal reports and more on sharp follow
up.
ICW and MTM. Should be shortened, made more efficient, with more time for multiple
bilateral or multilateral meetings as needed (“a marketplace”). Prior documentations should
be posted on the web.
In a later message, D. Baker added two more targets for downsizing: Center Boards and the
CG-level consultative committees.
6. Programmatic reorganization through inter-Center agreements
This model is outlined in a contribution by H. Zandstra. Programmatic changes lead the
reorganization of the system. The model is explicitly offered as an alternative to other
options that favor a move towards centralization of structure and governance.
The new CGIAR would recognize global and regional assignments, and central support
organizations. Global Programs and Regional Consortia would have their own  Boards.
Both would draw on capabilities from the Future Harvest Centers, NARS, ARIs, NGOs, the
private sector, and regional and international institutions. Future Harvest Centers would
disappear as programmatic units, and they would act as participants or conveners of Global
Programs and/or Regional Consortia; infrastructures would only be closed down if they
turn our to be unnecessary.
The Global Programs may manage activities in several regions using existing CGIAR
infrastructure.  Seven Global Programs are proposed: Livestock; Cereals; Root, Tubers and
Starchy Fruits; Forestry and Trees; Land and Water Resources; Aquatic Resources, and;
Policies.
Regional activities respond to regional needs and integrate the CGIAR's Global Programs
in the region. They will be the responsibility of Regional Consortia, and could develop
activities using infrastructure of several Centers in the region. Staff and programs would be
based in the Future Harvest Centers. Four Regional Consortia are proposed: Latin America
and the Caribbean; Sub-Saharan Africa; South and Central Asia, and; South East and East
Asia. Alternatively Regional Consortia could be developed strictly along clearly
demarcated boundaries of poverty regions, to allow the CGIAR to accommodate Western
and Northern China, Northeast Brazil, the Andean Region, Central America and many
other culturally or ecologically defined regions.
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The Central Support Organizations would respond to common needs of the Future Harvest
Centers and its donors. They would include the existing Secretariats for TAC and the
CGIAR, the Future Harvest Foundation and the AIARC, and could be expanded to include
an IPR and biotechnology support unit, as well as others, maintained by the Future Harvest
Centers and its donors.
It is argued that inter-center agreements will be largely sufficient to accommodate the
proposed programmatic orientations. These inter-center agreements would be approved by
TAC and sanctioned by the CGIAR. Creating a brand new structure will not result in large
gains in efficiency, since costs are driven by the intensive management needs of
multidisciplinary and participatory research. On the contrary, it is argued that the creation
of an entirely new structure would be financially demanding and result in large productivity
losses for a number of years.
Funding allocations would be the responsibility of the Global Programs and the Regional
Consortia and not of the Centers. The Centers would receive funding based on their specific
contributions to the Programs and Consortia.  The Future Harvest Foundation and other
bodies with global responsibilities, such as an institution to deal with IPR and other legal
issues, would be fully owned subsidiaries of the Centers, and would receive their funding
from them.
7. Single Board for Multiple Centers
M. Iwanaga and J.-P. Jacqmotte proposed  variants of a same approach: creating a unified
Board that would serve as the BOT of each and all Centers (in Iwanaga’s proposal) or of a
number of Centers (in Jacqmotte’s contribution), as required by each Center’s
establishment agreement. The Centers remain as independent units, but share a single
governance unit.
Such Board or Boards would “think System”, as they would look at effectiveness and
efficiency across the Centers it overseas, leading gradually to streamlining common
functions. Eventually, the Board may decide to merge some or all of the Centers under its
responsibility. In Iwanaga’s view, this Board would be composed of qualified members
serving full-time.
8. Merging or consolidating Centers and programs
D. Baker argued that the concept of ecoregions goes beyond the notion of “agroecological
zones” because they include not only biophysical and ecological variables and processes,
but also the political, institutional and developmental contexts in which agriculture takes
place. For this reason, Centers located in one region cannot effectively act across regions or
intervene in global partnerships such as those favored by the CG.
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A corollary is that some CG Centers need to be merged into a single institute or
consolidated into one single region. Examples would be merging IITA, ICRISAT and
WARDA in West Africa, consolidating ICRISAT so that it concentrates in South Asia, and
focusing ICRAF’s role in East and Southern Africa.
Another area for consolidation is the creation of Global Programs, as suggested by H.
Zandstra. This is seen necessary to react to the current fragmentation, duplication and lack
of critical mass resources in many areas.
9. Federation of Centers or Unified Center
R. Herdt proposed that decisive changes are necessary to prevent the CGIAR from losing
its effectiveness. After discussing other options, he proposed two alternatives: a Federated
or a Unified Center. Both of them imply a move towards a more centralized organization,
structure and governance system.
In the Unified model all the centers are merged into a single entity, with full and world-
wide authority over all areas of management.
In the Federated approach, a Federated Board would be created, and each Center Board
would give up certain of its powers and responsibilities. The chief responsibilities of the
Federal Board would be in the area of germplasm conservation and IPR. The Center Boards
would have to turn over part of their funds to the Federated Board to support its germplasm
and IPR responsibilities. The Federated Board may also undertake other functions, such as
Future Harvest, public education, fundraising, and perhaps personnel management.  The
Federated Board would deal directly with private companies and entities like GFAR and
the regional fora.
In both models, TAC would continue to be independent and maintain its functions of
quality evaluation and advise. Donors would retain their ability to directly fund the research
centers. The CG Secretariat would see its financial role greatly reduced.
The transition to the new structure would require a strong donor commitment to “send a
message” to the Centers on the necessity of change, and to provide transition funding to the
new Board. The Unified or Federated Board would initially be composed of several
representatives from each of the Centers, but it would have a fixed time limit to reduce its
size. This Board would have the authority for hiring the Executive of the new center. This
Executive would be responsible for appointing a Director for each Center site, and for
consolidating the system’s physical facilities. The new Center would establish legal entities
and operating agreements in each country.
10. Multiple organizational responses according to types of research
P. Matlon suggested that the applicability of regional organizational principles should
depend on the region-specificity of different types of research.
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Regionally-structured Centers would be needed to address problems that exist only or
mainly in one region. Such research can be strategic, applied or adaptive.
Regionally-structured Centers, acting in close collaboration with other similar Centers, are
applicable when the focus of research is on a particular agroecosystem that is important in
more than one region. Again, such research can be strategic, applied or adaptive.
Collaboration can take the form of one Center taking the lead on particular problems and
sharing results with other interested Centers through cross-center programs. Or expertise
from one Center may be outsourced to another one, on a full cost basis. To improve CGIAR
performance with this kind of inter-Center collaboration, it would be imperative to generate
a new incentive system that precludes competition around mobilizing resources for these
initiatives.
Global IARCs are needed to conduct research with broad generic applications across
regions and agroecosystems, such as basic research, methodological research and process
research. The CGIAR may want to consider locating these global IARCs in an area in a
country in the South in which advanced research organizations, small private research
firms, and major universities have developed the type of  highly symbiotic relationships
that are required to conduct the cutting edge science of today.
11. Market-driven organizational change
L. Swindale suggests that the Centers are in fact already experiencing a market-driven
reorganization process, simply because some are now receiving funds in excess of their
TAC-recommended levels, while others are receiving less.
No Centers should be allowed to exist solely on “formula” funding. All projects should be
forced to pay full costs, and Centers that attract funding by using program funds to pay for
the indirect costs of project-based funding, should be sanctioned. The Boards of those
Centers that are incapable of meeting their funding targets should meet with the Finance
Committee to discuss options that would include redirection, consolidation or closure.
Market-driven reorganization would reward flexibility and performance, would allow new
areas to be developed by the Centers, and would make the Centers responsible for their own
futures.
E. Binenbaum suggests that to reward flexibility and performance, the CGIAR could adopt
several principles of for-profit management such as: (a) splitting  innovative activities
among relatively small divisions (Centers), each of which should have considerable
freedom to formulate its own vision. A degree of competition among these divisions should
be allowed. Not all units need to subscribe to the same strategy by which the overall
organization seeks to reach its grand goals; (b) the central bodies (CGIAR) should
rigorously monitor the performance and success of each division, and couple the
monitoring and incentive systems.; (c)  the central bodies should restrict themselves to
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activities that are useful to all divisions and that carry economies of scale. In the case of the
CGIAR, these would include some fundraising activities that reinforce those of the
divisions (e.g., matching funds), advise on IP, and extending the IARCs network through
advise and through monitoring trends on the private and nonprofit agriculture, food and
biotech sectors.
Many of the dangers of market-driven change can be anticipated and be dealt with. For
example, a fraction of each Center’s funding is program based, and incentives can be
created to stimulate participation in partnerships.
12. Virtual institutes
This model was proposed by P. Cox. It is based on the notion that each CG Center has in
fact several “institutes” embedded in it, each of them responding to different roles: a
stewardship role, a research support role for national centers, a research role, and a
technology provision role.
Each of these roles has a different set of stakeholders, different implementation procedures,
different criteria for evaluation, and different funding sources. The central focus of a
reorganization based on this model would be on strengthening the integration between each
of these virtual institutes and the particular social structures within which they operate.
These virtual institutes would be sponsored by the CGIAR. Their role would be tightly
defined to deal with specific issues relevant to specific groups of stakeholders. They would
have a life span limited to the achievement of the objectives for which they were created.
They would be delocalized and highly networked, as it would involve multiple links with
many organizations. The staff of these institutes would in fact also be members of other
organizations, or independent consultants. Their contracts would be much more flexible
than today. The overhead costs of these virtual institutes would be lower because of their
highly focused roles, because the support staff costs would be covered by the hosting
organizations, and because the virtual institute may not require an independent physical
location.
13. An experiment on Action-Research Regional Centers
This model was suggested by members of the NGO Committee, in particular M.Altieri. It is
suggested that an experiment on regionally organized action-research be started in Latin
America, and in particular with CIAT, to test the regional approach and draw lessons that
can then be applied to the rest of the CGIAR.
CIAT should become a regional center, working only in Latin America; its work in Asia
and Africa would be taken over by IARCs and NARIs in those continents. CIAT would
establish strategic alliances with CIP, CATIE, NAROs, NGOs and farmers’ organizations,
to work in specific countries or inter-country regions characterized by high incidence of
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poverty. All institutions committed to poverty reduction in those countries would be able to
participate in this alliance.
Work would be based on the principles of  agroecology and integrated NRM (INRM). IPR-
free biotechnology can be also used if the poor through a participatory approach see any
advantage in those innovations.
Research would be based on hundreds of ongoing local initiatives that are already making
advances in providing food security and environmental preservation for resource poor
farmers in marginal environments. The role of the regionalized CIAT would focus on
strategic research, institution-building and policy changes to upscale those ongoing local
initiatives.
Other important elements of the NGO Committee general proposals that would be
applicable to this experiment, include: To support capacity building at the national level
primarily through collaborative research  and analysis of experiences and not only through
training; genuine collaborative research involves partnerships in all stages of the research
process; regional centers should be supported by System-wide programs that address issues
to different ecological zones (e.g., water, agrobiodiversity, interdisciplinary methodologies,
and participatory research methods), and; the poor and civil society should be deeply
involved in all governance functions and bodies.
14. Dissolving the Centers into other organizations
R. Hawkins asked: Why are the Centers still needed?  He pointed out at the plethora of
research organizations in the North and in the South: private corporations, advanced
research institutes, universities, NAROs, NGOs, and many regional, sub-regional, and
thematic centers, consortia, and networks.
He suggested that the CGIAR  should consider the option of basing many of its programs at
the facilities of these other players. Some of this already exists, and the question is if the
process should and could be accelerated, with a view at phasing out some or all of the
Centers completely, with the probable exception of an independent, international base for
genetic resources.
In this view, getting rid of the Centers would allow the CGIAR to concentrate on financing
research, improving quality, and directing resources to where they are most needed,
perhaps on a more competitive basis.
However, other participants observed that the proposal that centers divest all or part of their
mandate commodities to one or more NARS  has been considered exhaustively in the past
and seriously tried on at least one occasion with “disastrous results.”
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CONCLUSIONS
This conference has brought out several dimensions that cut across our thinking about why
and how should the structure, organization and governance of the CGIAR be revised. It is
apparent that these issues are not limited to questions of management or organizational
preferences: they reflect profound differences of opinion about the mission of the CGIAR
and the strategies that are required to achieve its goals and objectives.
A first conclusion, then, is that if the CGIAR wants to base its new organization on a
broadly shared understanding of what the System is about and what it should be doing in
the next ten years, then it needs to spend more time and effort in building that consensus,
before moving ahead into the questions of structure, organization and governance.
Of course, given the huge complexities of building such common understanding among the
large and diverse number of stakeholders and interested parties, the key players in the CG
may well decide that it is better to build a narrow coalition and move ahead come what
may, rather than risk paralysis.
This is a truly strategic decision.
Another fundamental question is if the same structure, organization and governance
systems can effectively accommodate both Genetic Resource Management and Poverty
Reduction and NRM. The variables, stakeholders, trends, determinants, and performance
criteria that were relevant to one issue almost disappeared from our dialogue when we
moved to the second one, and a largely new set of questions and concerns appeared. Of
course, this could be due to how the conference was structured and managed, but perhaps
there are real reasons behind this discontinuity.
Deciding on a new structure, organization and governance system for the CGIAR would
mean answering questions  such as the following, that came out in this conference:
§ Decentralization and putting the Centers first, or centralization and putting global
entities first? Change at the top to open more space for the Centers, the regions and
the ecoregions, or to be able to deal better with global issues that require centralized
and global decision-making authority?
§ Safeguarding the position of the CG as an institution tightly focused on providing
well defined international public goods, with a strong emphasis on basic and
strategic research, or moving closer to embedding the CG’s functions within
broader and more comprehensive development efforts?
§ A gradual, evolutionary approach based largely on the present structures and
governance systems, or a more radical departure from the status quo and into more
modern organizational paradigms?
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§ Governance changes to facilitate greater involvement and participation in decision-
making for a broader set of stakeholders and end users of technology, or a more
closed system of governance in which scientists and research administrators hold
most of the important cards?
§ Structural changes to improving efficiency, or to facilitate programmatic change?
§ A process driven by changes in governance and incentives, or by changes in
structure and organization?
The “models” offered in the conference on structure, organizations and governance,
highlight that many options are possible and available, depending on how the CGIAR
answers questions such as those stated above. But perhaps we would all agree that there are
many gaps and unanswered questions in each of those propositions. It is obvious that we
have not yet reached a point in which these or other models have been carefully and
rigorously analyzed. While some may argue that there is no point in detailed discussions of
specific alternatives until the major strategic questions have been answered, perhaps what is
needed is precisely for more detailed analysis to shed new light into the larger issues.
